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The Remoteness Doctrine: A
Rationale For a Rational
Limit on Tort Liability
Victor E. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since I had the great opportunity to begin teaching torts over three decades
ago, I have learned that there are certain aspects to this wonderful subject that
fascinate students. One of those aspects is the cornucopia of cascading tort law
words, "new words" that the students had not known before.
Some of these words I call "tort fuel." They make tort law go faster. Strict
liability is such a word; comparative negligence is another such term. When
comparative negligence entered California law in the case of Li v. Yellow Cab,' it
swiftly ended an archaic, two century-old rule that made people lose cases even if
they were one percent at fault.
But there are also "brake words" in tort law. These are words to limit tort law
explosions and keep liability exposure from going all over the place and causing
complete mayhem. Assumption of risk is a brake word. Why should somebody
who absolutely knows there is a risk and fully understands it and decides to
encounter it be entitled to collect money for the very harms caused by the very risk
the person knowingly encountered?
Proximate cause is another brake word. Causation cannot extend forever.
Duty is another. Even though somebody may be at fault and have proximately
caused "harm," there may be public policy reasons why a duty is not owed to a
particular plaintiff. In California, for example, for a period of time the California
Supreme Court flirted with the idea of letting people recover damages for
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emotional harm because a loved one was injured, even though the claimant was not
present when the loved one was hurt. After thirty years, the Supreme Court of
California finally put the brakes on such a claim and held that there was no duty
owed to such claimants.2 Sure, we may be sympathetic about the person's
emotional harm, but should people who hear about a serious injury be allowed a
monetary damage claim in addition to the very serious claim that is held by the
injured person"
Sometimes the magic words of tort law so excite law students (and lawyers)
that they embrace them too much. The words take on a life of their own, and one
forgets the basic common sense that always should be applied in both life and in
the law of torts. The words in themselves create no real magic, but are there to
provide rational and reasonable guidelines.
I would like to discuss such a word today, "remoteness." It is a brake word in
tort law, and provides a rational limit on tort claims. Unlike words such as
"proximate cause," "duty," "comparative negligence," the terms "remoteness" or
"remoteness doctrine" have not found a carefully articulated rationale in many
judicial opinions.
The remoteness doctrine is sometimes used to dismiss claims-a court
concludes that a claim is "too remote" to permit recovery. Today, I would like to
share with you a rationale for the remoteness doctrine, and show why sound public
policy sponsors its application in some of the most controversial cases of our day.
HI. THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE: YOU CAN JUST FEEL IT
Basic common sense is an inextricable part of the law of torts. Common sense
can make virtually anyone have the "feel" for the remoteness doctrine as the
rational limit on tort law.
For example, virtually every day on the freeways of Los Angeles, there is an
accident. Often it involves the negligence of one or more individuals. Similar acts
of automobile driver negligence occur on crowded thoroughfares throughout the
country. When these accidents occur, they bring with them huge traffic tie-ups.
Many people are delayed, sometimes for a long period of time, all because of the
negligence of one or two people.
When people are delayed are highways, it is quite foreseeable that in some
instances, the result would be more than a mere inconvenience. People may need
to get to hospitals under emergency conditions, and not make it. Millions of
dollars, perhaps billions of dollars, are lost in economic opportunities. A person
may fail to meet at a given time for a job interview, and loses the opportunity. A
person may fail to show up for a sales opportunity that was virtually certain, and
loses the sale as a result of the delay. But, if a person who is hurt is unable to get
to a hospital, or the person who has lost a job opportunity, or a person who loses
2. See Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
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the sale sues the negligent driver, they would lose. While we may "feel their pain,"
their claim is too remote. The case law is absolutely clear on this issue, as is
common sense.
There are many other plain, common sense examples of the remoteness
doctrine. The torts casebook I coauthor is filled with some, even approaching the
humorous.3 For example, in one case, a manufacturer sold a defective dog collar.
The collar broke and the dog escaped from the grips of its owner. It bit someone.
The victim sued the collar's manufacturer. A court held, with sympathy and
understanding, that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the manufacturer of
the dog collar. The harm was too remote.4
I11. THE LEGAL STEEL BEHIND REMOTENESS
Apart from common sense, there is legal steel behind the remoteness doctrine.
One can trace this steel back 150 years to the case of Anthony v. Slaid.' In that
case, the plaintiff contracted to provide support to all the paupers in a small
Massachusetts town for a specific period of time. Defendant Slaid assaulted a
pauper and caused him significant injuries. As a result, plaintiff suffered an
economic loss. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clearly and
unequivocally rejected the plaintiff's claim against the defendant as too remote.6
The legal steel behind the remoteness doctrine is seen most clearly in the
context of injuries in the workplace. A worker is injured after a safety guard
breaks off a power tool he is using. The employer suffers a very foreseeable
economic loss and pays the worker $ 50,000 in worker compensation. The
employer also suffers other foreseeable economic harms. The worker has to be
replaced; somebody new has to be trained; The job site does not produce as much
during that time period. There is a whole litany of adverse economic results, and
all of them are quite foreseeable.
But the law is steel in this area. The employer's right to recover for economic
harms focuses solely on the amount he or she paid in worker compensation. No
more and no less. The employer has no independent cause of action against the
company that made the machine. The employer's right is derivative in nature. It
stems from and is tied to the injured. worker"s product liability claim. The
employer can recover its worker compensation costs if the employee's product
3. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
335-40 (9th Ed. 1994).
4. See Oehler v. Davis, 298 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1972).
5. 52 Mass. 290 (1846).
6. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this principle 150 years later. See Associated
Contractors of Calif. v. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 533 n.25 (1983).
liability claim is successful. Lawyers call this basic principle "subrogation."
Courts agree that an independent, separate claim by the employer is simply "too
remote."
The same remoteness principle has been applied to the Federal Government
when it has suffered an economic loss that is derived from an injury that was
negligently inflicted upon a soldier or citizen. This point takes on added
significance in light of discussions that the United States may try to bring a direct
claim against manufacturers of tobacco products to recoup Medicare costs
allegedly incurred as a resulting of treating illnesses allegedly caused by smoking.
The United States Supreme Court has been clear on this subject. For example,
in a case stemming back fifty-two years, United States v. Standard Oil of
California,7 a Standard Oil truck negligently hit a member of the Armed Forces.8
The United States provided the serviceman with hospitalization and helped him
recover.9 The United States then tried to bring a separate, independent cause of
action against Standard Oil to recover the costs of medical services it provided to
the serviceman.'0 The Supreme Court clearly and unequivocally held that the
United States had no independent cause of action-its claim was too remote." The
Court stated that if the law was to be changed, it should be done by the Congress. 2
IV. WHAT Is BEHIND THE STEEL?
Looking at cases over the past 150 years that have applied or not applied the
remoteness doctrine, one can derive certain principles that the court uses to explain
when the brake on liability will be enforced. Sometimes the remoteness doctrine
is intertwined with traditional concepts of "proximate cause." While other times
it may be intertwined with duty limitations. These particular labels can cause more
confusion than clarity; but the remoteness doctrine stands on its own and a
rationale explaining its application can be gleaned from the cases. There are four
key factors to consider in applying the remoteness doctrine.
7. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).




12. See id. at 317. Congress has given the United States certain procedural advantages in suing
tortfeasors that have injured servicepersons and federal workers. See Medical Care Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2561 (discussing that the Government is subject to the same substantive rules of tort law that
apply to injured persons, but procedural rules such as statues of limitation applicable to injured persons
do not bar the Government's claims). Congress also has permitted direct actions against primary
medical care insurers (but not individual tortfeasors) for costs arising under Medicare. See Medicare
Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii).
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A. Were There Intervening Acts Between the Defendant's Conduct and
the Plaintiff's Loss?
The greater the number of separate intervening acts between the defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's loss makes it more likely that the remoteness doctrine will
be applied. While sometimes discussed under the rubric of foreseeability, the focus
is much more on whether separate and independent acts have intervened between
the defendant's wrongful act and the plaintiff's harm.
For example, in the New York case of Kingsman Transit Co. v. City of
Buffalo, 3 a defendant negligently and improperly moored a ship at a dock. 4 The
river on which it was docked was filled with floating ice. 5 The ice and debris
accumulated and built a wedge between the ship and the dock; this was intervening
act No. 16 Pressure from the wedge snapped the mooring line; this was
intervening act No. 2.'" The ship floated downstream and hit another ship; this was
intervening act No. 3. That ship in turn broke loose-this was intervening act No.
4.18 The two ships floated down the river together and were about to a hit a
drawbridge. 9 The crew that normally would be on the drawbridge was not present;
this was intervening act No. 5.2o The ships hit the bridge and as a result, the
plaintiffs whose ship was moored below that bridge could not deliver grain
upstream.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second circuit held that the
defendant's negligent act was too remote.22
B. Duplicate Recovery For The Same Harm Should Be Avoided
A theme stressed again and again in cases applying the remoteness doctrine is
that the law should prevent the possibility of duplicate recovery for the same harm.
This can be seen very clearly in the Standard Oil case, where the United States
13. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).








22. See id. at 824.
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tried to bring a claim for the medical services it provided to a serviceman.23 It is
also seen in the case where an employer is seeking an independent claim for
medical costs it expended on behalf of a worker.
In both instances-the one with the serviceman and the one with the worker, the
primary claim is that of the injured party.24 The injured party often brings a claim
where there is negligence. In that claim, the injured party is entitled to recover all
of his or her economic losses, regardless of whether they already had been
reimbursed by an employer or, in the instance of the serviceperson, by the United
States. As those of you who enjoy the law of torts know, that is the essence of the
so-called "collateral source rule," the defendant cannot benefit from the fact that
the plaintiff was already compensated by another source.
If courts begin to permit independent economic loss claims that proceed or
follow primary claims by injured persons, opportunities are rife for duplicate
recoveries.
C. An Avalanche of Claims Can Prompt the Application of the
Remoteness Doctrine
Recall the situation of the negligent driver on the freeway. It was clearly
foreseeable that people would be delayed, and the delay could cause a person not
to get to a hospital or miss ajob opportunity. The situation presented very real and
potential economic losses. But what was also clear was permitting claims beyond
those who were directly hurt in the accident could result in an avalanche of claims.
Hundreds of people could claim an economic loss. Many people might claim an
indirect physical harm. Concerns about a potential avalanche of claims which
would drown the original primary claim are a real and legitimate reason for
application of the remoteness doctrine.
D. Indirect Economic Harm Suggests Remoteness
As our casebook and other basic texts on torts reflect, there is a "harm priority
pyramid" in the law of torts. At the top of the pyramid is personal injury, tort law
first and properly respects claims involving a direct, physical harm to a person.
Next, it respects and allows claims for negligent or wrongful damage to property.
On the bottom of the "tort priority pyramid" are claims for pure economic harm.
Sometimes they are allowed'and sometimes they are not.25 They are much more
likely to be deemed remote when they are indirect economic harms, such as an
23. See U.S. v. Standard Oil of Calif. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
24. See generally id.
25. See WADE supra note 3, at 448-60.
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employer's lost profits, because a worker was injured.
V. UNPOPULAR DEFENDANTS AND THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE
Adult beverages such as beer, wine, and liquor, firearms, fast automobiles and
high fat foods may cause personal injuries to individuals. They also can cause a
myriad of very foreseeable, indirect economic harms. Should the remoteness
doctrine be applied in such cases?
The most experience on this question is gained from recent litigation involving
tobacco products. For almost fifty years, smokers have brought personal injury
claims against tobacco companies. Most of these claims have been unsuccessful,
because of the assumption of risk defense, problems proving causation, and other
facts.
The new trend tobacco cases have not been brought by smokers but by states,
cities, union pension funds, private insurers, and others who claim to have suffered
indirect economic losses because of injuries to smokers. In these cases, the
remoteness doctrine has been a significant obstacle for plaintiffs. Attorney
Generals and plaintiffs' lawyers have struggled to develop new theories to create
"independent" causes of action that would leave the common law barrier of the
remoteness doctrine. Surprisingly, despite the unpopularity of tobacco defendants,
most courts have followed basic principles of tort law and have applied the
remoteness doctrine to dismiss claims that had involved indirect economic losses
and are derivative in nature.26 The same has been true with guns. Let us review the
remoteness factors and see how they apply in these cases.
A. Are There Intervening Acts Between the Defendant's Conduct and
the Plaintiff's Loss?
With cigarettes, a person's choice to smoke can be deemed an independent act.
While arguments have been made that the smoker really has no choice because the
26. See e.g. Iowa v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998); City of Birmingham, Ala. v.
American Tobacco Co., 10F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1998); Williams& Drake Co., Inc. v. American
Tobacco Co., No. 98-553 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C98-559R
(W.D. Wash. 1999); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund,
1998 WL 8492328 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998
WL 685364 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Oregon Laborers-Employees Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 544305 (D. Ore. 1998); Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998 WL
723158 (D. Md. 1998); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998
WL 212846 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
1998 WL 186878 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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smoker is addicted, that standard is more applicable to the smoker's personal claim
than an indirect economic harm to third parties claim. A person who has suffered
an indirect economic harm because a third party was shot faces a major intervening
act between the sale of the product and his indirect economic injury-that of the
gunman. The same is true if a case were brought against a manufacturer of liquor
or beer because of the acts of a drunk driver.
B. Duplicate Recovery For The Same Harm Should Be Avoided
Whether it be liquor, guns, tobacco, or other unpopular defendants, allowing
a third party a direct claim for the injury of another person, raises a clear potential
for duplicate recoveries, just as it has under traditional cases that have applied the
remoteness doctrine for over 150 years.
C. Avalanche of Claims Can Prompt The Application of The Doctrine
One need not speculate whether failure to apply the remoteness doctrine in
indirect economic claims brought against unpopular defendants will lead to an
avalanche of claims. Once the remoteness doctrine was abandoned by a few lower
courts in tobacco cases, others who thought they could show an indirect economic
loss saw an opening for claims, including health providers, Indian tribes and, most
recently, foreign countries including Guatemala, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Israel, and
France.
Just as would be true with the avalanche of claims that could stem from an
accident on the highway, the remoteness doctrine's disappearance in cases that may
seem sympathetic puts forth a legal change that would encourage an avalanche of
claims.
Consider an example that is currently being pondered by some of my friends
in the plaintiffs' bar. Almost any automobile can be driven over 100 miles an
hour-just look at your own speedometer. In virtually every state, speeds over
eighty miles per hour are illegal. Consider an individual who is hit by a speeding
car. Suppose his medical costs are paid for by the state or a health insurer. Should
the state or a medical insurer be permitted to proceed against the automobile's
manufacturer? As my friends in the plaintiffs' bar suggest, governors can be
placed on all automobiles that would prevent them from exceeding the maximum
legal speed limit. The avalanche of claims envelope pushed further, includes
everyone who has suffered an economic loss due to high speed accidents. One then
gets closer to an understanding of the potential avalanche of claims in the tobacco
and gun cases.
There is more to the food chain of a potential avalanche of claims. Although
it is sometimes trivialized in terms of what could become "real law," sellers of high
fat foods could one day be defendants. High fat foods are a substantial health
[Vol. 27: 759, 2000] The Remoteness Doctrine
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hazard. They are particularly hazardous to certain parts of our population; for
example, many males in their early 20s unknowingly suffer from preliminary
arteriosclerosis. Those who sell high fat foods intend that all people heartily
consume their products-simply look at the playgrounds outside so many McDonal-
ds that entice parents and children alike, or even at Ronald McDonald himself.
Their products-french fries and hamburgers-are being used "as intended." This
use may lead to serious health hazards and major indirect economic losses to
Medicaid, Medicare and health insurers. The abandonment of the remoteness
doctrine could allow claims if coupled with abandonment of certain other
fundamental tort principles, such as the need to identify a particular defendant.
When defendants are unpopular, those barriers can also fall.
How does such abandonment of legal principles occur? Let's look at how the
remoteness doctrine was overcome in the State Attorney General tobacco cases.
No State Supreme Court in the Attorney General tobacco cases created a new and
independent cause of action by the state against tobacco companies or rejected the
remoteness doctrine. Its rejection came in a few lower court decisions which
created a new rule that the state had an independent "quasi-sovereign" right which
superceded the traditional remoteness doctrine.27 There was no precedent or
principles supporting this theory.
The only precedent for the "quasi-sovereign" doctrine was to allow states to
obtain injunctive relief to prevent harm, not to create causes of action for indirect
economic loss against unpopular defendants.
As I have indicated, the specific "quasi-sovereign" theory was rejected by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Standard Oil case as applied to the
United States.
The remoteness doctrine also can be trumped by a legislature. That was done
in Florida and Vermont.28 Such attempts could occur at the federal level, in the
not-too-distant future.
VI. CONCLUSION
As I look back at the thirty years of study and practice in the law of torts, I am
impressed by the fact that when tort law principles have been put to the test by
unpopular defendants, most judges have upheld those principles, but it has not
always been so. For example, about fifteen years ago, some courts created an
27. See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 965 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (speculating about
what "would be" Texas law).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910; 1998 Vermont Laws P.A. 142 (H. 749), codified in part at 33 VT.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1904, 1911.
"asbestos law" of super strict liability that applied only against manufacturers of
asbestos-containing products.29 When the same principles were applied against
manufacturers of drugs, courts ran away from the new doctrine they created."0 One
can stand back and make moral judgments about "tobacco law," "gun law" or
"asbestos law" without being in the actual shoes of a judge-I do not choose to do
so. I can only state the dilemma judges face in the context of tobacco, guns, liquor,
and other products that create manifold remote risks of indirect economic harm.
On the one hand, the remoteness doctrine has a long history and a clear public
policy rationale. As most judges have appreciated, the rationale and precedent
should lead to dismissal of such claims., On the other hand, judges may believe
strongly that the harms created by guns, tobacco or liquor are such a threat in our
society, that remoteness principles should be abandoned, regardless of the
theoretical and practical implications of doing so.
The most difficult issue is whether tort law principles should be set aside for
some defendants and not others. That leads to the toughest question of all-whether
the theme of equal justice under the law still has life in America.
29. One court specifically refused to do so. See Iowa v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa
1998).
30. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1996). Legislatures acted as well.
For instance, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) and Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986), were overruled by legislation so as to require
proof of defect. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-3(3) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1)
(1991). Another case, Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (holding handgun
manufacturer strictly liable for injury resulting from properly functioning "Saturday Night Special"),
was subsequently overruled by legislation. See MD. ANN. CODE ART. 27, § 36-1(h) (West Supp. 1990).
